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Rapid growth of urban areas and their development problems in industrializing countries have had 
major impacts on the environment. Water, the main source of life on earth is under the threat of 
various types of pollution. These threats have been forceful in demonstrating the necessity of the 
management  and  planning  of  drainage  basins.  The  importance  of  the  evaluation  of  the  total 
economic value of the water resources and aquatic ecosystems of drainage basins has not yet been 
accepted in the current planning system of Turkey. However, there are many actors and regulations 
about  environmental  issues  and  planning.  Furthermore,  these  actors  can  make  decision, 
independently.  This  situation  causes  conflicts  among  actors,  so  the  situation  calls  for  the 
organization of special drainage management institutions for drainage basins.  
The aim of this paper is to explore the use of game theoretic approach to analyze the strategic 
decisions of different interest groups (players) and develop a better understanding of the decision 
making  process  and  its  consequences  on  a  drainage  basin.  We  use  the  case  of  the  Nilüfer 
Watershed  from  the  north-western  region  of  Turkey.  The  Nilüfer  Watershed  contains  fertile 
agricultural lands and the third biggest industrial city (Bursa). In addition, a strategic plan prepared 
for Bursa Province, so we can evaluate some strategies with helping game theory, and application 
of the strategic decisions will also discuss.  
Key  words:  strategic  decision  making,  game  theory,  sustainable  development,  water  basin 
planning. 
 
   2 
1. Introduction 
Ever  since  the  II.  World  War  our  planet  has  been  experiencing  continuous  growth  of 
population and consumption of natural sources. Environmental problems and sustainable 
development  policies  have  been  on  the  agenda  of  a  number  of  the  United  Nations 
Conferences, especially after 1980s. (Bartone, C., and others, 1995; Serageldin and others, 
1995). Indeed, the significance of the ecological approach for economic growth was being 
discussed as early as 1970s (Isard, 1972; Kozlowski and Hughes, 1972). These efforts 
pointed to the need for a renewed way of addressing such problems. Spatial planning today 
is faced with the challenge to promote sustainable urban development and management 
policies to overcome the economic and ecological costs. The management and protection 
of the  water  resource and the  hydrological  system is closely related to the  sustainable 
management of river basins. Therefore the ecological approach to planning has emphasized 
the importance of the river basin concept in spatial planning (Teclaff, 1996; Aydemir and 
Aydemir, 1998; Heathcote, 1998; Reimold, 1998).  
The concept of “river basin” as an integrated spatial planning unit is not recognized in the 
current planning and management system in Turkey even though specific river basins are 
defined by the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI￿ ). Although, water basin 
development plans (only drinking water resources) also take place within special purposed 
physical  plans  and  special  location  plans,  water  basin  management  can  not  be  solved 
(Ünal, 2003; Law no: 4856, 2003; Law No: 5216, 2004; http://www.dsi.gov.tr). Therefore, 
there  are  many  actors  who  make  decision  on  environmental  and  planning  issues  in  a 
watershed.  
Strategic planning approach is also a suggested tool for sustainable development (Hens and 
Nath, 2003; Williams, 2002; Leitmann, 1994). Strategic choice approach, which is used in 
industrial  management,  depends  on  decision  theory.  Strategic  planning  has  been  used, 
especially in England, since the 1960s, and systematic methods have been developed in 
British strategic planning such as interrelated decision areas technique. Today, strategic 
planning  occurs  in  the  EU  directives  for  a  balanced  regional  development  with 
environmental consciousness (Williams, 2002). The concept of “strategic planning” has 
been appropriated especially in metropolitan cities in Turkey, recently. The Municipality 
Law (Law no: 5272, article 17, 38, 41, 2004) and the Metropolitan Municipality Law (Law 
No: 5216, article 7, 18, 2004) consist of strategic plan approach.    3 
This paper aims to explore the applicability of the game theory to the problem of strategic 
decision and sustainable development within a river basin. According to Selten (1988), 
most of the strategic decision problems occur in human life and they are quite complicated. 
Usually, rational solutions are not easily available. Selten (1988) emphasizes “strategic 
decision problems  of business and war  are subject to the  additional  difficulty  that the 
unstructured nature of such situations makes it very hard to analyze them in a rigorous 
way”.  We believe that decision making under uncertainty or non-cooperative situation in 
planning  seems  like  the  decision  problems  of  business  and  military.  Nijkamp  (1980) 
proposes negotiations between agents for solving externalities in environmental problems 
and  he  added  that  game-theoretic  strategies  could  be  used  for  negotiations.  Therefore, 
game theory, which explains the uncertain situation that many decision makers are in, will 
affect planning discipline in a positive way.  
2. Method: Game Theory 
Game theory explains the interactive decision making process in the situation with more 
than one decision maker (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Luce and Raiffa, 1967; 
Myerson,  1991;  Aumann  and  Hart,  1992).  Möbius  (2004)  explains  “game  theory  is  a 
formal  way  to  analyze  interaction  among  a  group  of  rational  agents  who  behave 
strategically”. Luce and Raiffa (1967) define the term of interactive such as “each player 
attempts to maximize his utility in a situation where his outcome depends not only upon 
his choice, but upon the choices of each of the other players; in turn, their choices are 
influenced by the choice they think he is going to make, for they too are attempting to 
maximize a function over which they do not have full control”. Rationality and common 
knowledge are basically assumed in the theory (Luce and Raiffa, 1967; Rasmusen, 1994). 
In other words, every decision maker chooses what is best for his/her and expects the best 
response.  
Modern  applications  of  game  theory,  in  particular  to  social  sciences,  use  mainly  non-
cooperative  games;  because  non-cooperative  games  are  better  at  defining  real  world 
situations (Gardner, 1995; Ritzberger, 2002). Players, information, strategies, payoffs, and 
equilibrium are essential elements in a game (Rasmusen, 1994). Information of players 
about the decision situation affects choices of players. Indeed, expectations or preferences 
are determined to be a players’ decision (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Luce and 
Raiffa, 1967). Games, in which each player knows exactly what has happened in previous   4 
moves,  are  called  games  with  “perfect  information”  such  as  chess  (Mycielski,  1992). 
Additionally, if every player knows the rules of game and payoff function, a game has 
complete information (Vego-Redondo, 2003; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Some special 
two-person, non-cooperative games are shown in Table 1.  




    Prisoner 2 
    Deny  Confess 
Deny  1, 1  0, 8  Prisoner 1 
Confess   8, 0  2, 2 
 
 
Battle of the Sexes 
 
    Husband 
    Boxing  Opera 
Boxing  1, 2  0, 0   




    Player 2 
    Heads  Tails 
Heads  1, -1  -1, 1  Player 1 
  Tails  -1, 1  1, -1 
 
Rock Paper Scissors   
    Child 2 
    rock  paper  scissors 
rock  0, 0  -1, 1  1, -1 
paper  1, -1  0, 0  -1, 1 
 
Child 1 
scissors  -1, 1  1, -1  0, 0 
 
For games with only two players, the strategic form can be very conveniently represented 
by two matrices of the same dimension. Player 1’s pure strategies are identified with the 
rows  of  the matrices (player 1 is the “row player”) and player  2’s pure strategies are 
identified with the columns of the matrices (player 2 is the “column player”). The left entry 
is Player 1’s pay off and the right, player 2’s. Bold characters represent the best response 
each player.  
Equilibrium is a set of the best strategies. In other words, in equilibrium, each player is 
playing the strategy that is a "best response" to the strategies of the other players (Gardner, 
1995). No one has an incentive to change his strategy given the strategy choices of the 
others.  Dominance  approach  is  used  to  solve  two-person  games.  A  dominant  strategy 
solution  exists  when  every  player  has  a  dominant  strategy  (Von  Neumann  and 
Morgenstern, 1944; Vego-Redondo, 2003). For instance, players have a dominant strategy 
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, so the pair of the dominant strategies is equilibrium point 
(see in Table 1). However, some games have no dominant strategy. These kinds’ games are 
solved  by  process  of  elimination  which  is  called  iterated  dominance  or  iterated  strict 
dominance (Fudenberg and Triole, 1991; Ritzberger, 2002). The Battle of the Sexes and   5 
The Matching Pennies (see in Table 1) can not be solved by a dominance approach. On the 
other  hand,  a  mixed  strategy  equilibrium  also  exists.  Nash  (1951)  defines  equilibrium 
points as “a finite non-cooperative game always has at least one equilibrium point”, and in 
a Nash equilibrium each agent plays the best response to the equilibrium strategies of the 
other agents. Vego-Redondo (2003) defines more detailed the theorem; “in every game 
where there is any finite number of players and these players have only a finite number of 
pure  strategies  available, some  Nash equilibrium (possibly in  mixed strategies) always 
exists”. Selten (1988) introduced the idea of refinements of the Nash equilibrium with the 
concept of (subgame) perfect equilibria in 1965. Aumann (1974) proposed the concept of a 
correlated  equilibrium  and  Myerson  (1994)  has  developed  this  equilibrium  concept. 
Harsanyi  (1967)  developed  the  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium  in  games  with  incomplete 
information. At the same time, cooperative game theory reached important result in papers 
by Nash (1950) and Shapley (1953) on bargaining games. Aumann and Hart (1992) define 
the bargaining theory as a “bridge” between the non-cooperative and the cooperative game 
theory.  
After the publication of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) book, game theory has 
become an increasingly important approach for theoretical analysis in the social sciences 
such as international relationship, sociology, psychology, evolutionary biology, computer 
science and management sciences. However, the theory has been widely used in economy 
and war scenarios. Although game theory applications in planning are limited in number, 
they are very important studies on location problem in spatial planning. Stevens (1961) 
researches the strategic problem of two competitive sellers’ location along a line. Hotelling 
formulation was used to solve this problem as a simple two-person, zero-sum game. Isard 
and Reiner (1962) explore behaviours of industrialists who choose location for investment. 
Isard (1967) investigates the location of a large-scale steel plant in alternatives of three 
regions which desire to promote an industrial agglomeration. The choosing procedure is an 
alternating leader-follower procedure. Gabszewich and Thisse (1992) designed the model 
to describe spatial competition among firms. In this model, a population of consumers is 
spread out over a geographical area, while firms selling a homogeneous product are located 
in  the  same  space.  Furthermore,  firms  named  as  players,  and  prices  and/or  location 
determined strategies.  
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We see that game theory is commonly used in location problems in planning. On the other 
hand, game theory is vastly used in environmental problems such as sharing of natural 
resources problems and reduction of emission. Hardin (2000) published a paper called “the 
Tragedy of the Commons” in 1968. This famous paper deals with “freedom in a commons 
brings ruin to all”, and he applied the prisoners’ dilemma to the problem of population 
growth  and  natural  resources.  In  addition,  water-sharing  and  reduction  of  emission 
problems requires cooperation amoung countries, and the outcomes depend on cooperation 
of agents in these studies (Ray, 2000; Maler and Zeeuw, 1998; Barret, 1998; Kuismin, 
1998). Similarly, sharing problem of a river as a natural resource is the main study area in 
environmental planning and regional science (Dinar and Wolf, 1994; Kucukmehmetoglu 
and Guldman, 2002; Rogers, 1993). Freeman (2000) used the game theoretic approach, 
also for a water-sharing problem according to international law in Tigris-Euphrates Basin. 
Other  research  is  about  the  Tigris-Euphrates  River  using  game  theory  by 
Kucukmehmetoglu (2004). In the paper, coalition among agents is discussed and satisfying 
the level of each country is demonstrated by using Shapley Value.  
In this paper, strategic decision making processes are analyzed in two-player and non-
cooperative games, and Nash equilibrium is explored in these games. Players generally 
make  independent  decisions  without  any  form  of  cooperation  situation  in  the  Nilüfer 
watershed.  Decision  makers,  behaviours,  and  conflicts  are  examined  next  chapter.  We 
evaluate the strategies of industrial development, environmental protection and industrial 
location in the watershed which are determined by Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan.  
3. Determination of Decision Makers, Strategies and Conflicts in the Nilüfer 
Watershed 
3.1. Economic Development and Environmental Infrastructure  
The Nilüfer Watershed, which is the most polluted part in the Susurluk River Basin from 
the north-western region of Turkey, is chosen as the case study area. The Nilüfer Stream is 
deeply polluted by industrial, agricultural and domestic wastewater (Bursa Environmental 
Report, 2000; Report of Bursa Wastewater Master Plan, 2002). The provincial border of 
Bursa does not correspond with the Nilüfer Watershed’s natural borders. Basin boundaries 
and administrative borders do not match and this creates many actors as decision makers. 
The geographical location of the Nilüfer Watershed is seen below Figure 1.     7 
There  has  been  an  increase  in  the  population  growth  rate  within  the  area  due  to  the 
industrial  development  in  the  1960s  and  since  then.  In  2000,  population  of  the  Bursa 
Province was over 2 million and 3.3 million people are expected to live in metropolitan 
region  in  2020  (SIS,  2002a;  Bursa  2020  Strategic  Plan,  1998).  Therefore,  the 
environmental infrastructure of the city of Bursa has been planned according to expected 
population (Report of Wastewater Master Plan, 2002). However, its infrastructure is not 
even sufficient to fulfill the needs of its present population. There are sewerage systems in 
all the settlements that have municipality, but cesspools are used in villages. However, 
none of the settlements have wastewater treatment plants except the Bursa metropolitan 
area. Unfortunately, the other settlements’ domestic wastewaters are discharged directly 
into the Nilüfer Stream or its branches. Additionally, leakages of domestic solid wastes 
cause ground water pollution because of inefficient sanitary landfill (Report of Wastewater 
Master Plan, 2002, Bursa Environmental Report, 2000; Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, 1998, 
Action Plan of Blue Nilüfer, 1997). 
 
Figure 1.  The Nilüfer Watershed in the Susurluk River Basin (adapted from DSI, 2000; 
Geographical Map of Turkey, p 20,21, 40, 41, 2004; Bas￿ aran and Bölen, 2004) 
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Bursa is the third biggest industrial city in Turkey (SIS, 1993; SIS, 2002a). Nowadays, 
there are 6 organized industrial districts and 2 small scale industrial areas in the watershed. 
Additionally, 2 more organized industrial districts and 9 small scale industrial areas are 
under  construction.  The  organized  industrial  districts  in  the  watershed  do  not  have  a 
common wastewater treatment plant except the Bursa Organized Industrial District. The 
Bursa Organized Industrial District was constructed in 1961, and the common wastewater 
treatment  plant  was  built  in  1998  (Report  of  Wastewater  Master  Plan,  2002,  Bursa 
Environmental  Report,  2000;  Action  Plan  of  Blue  Nilüfer,  1997).  Land  use  in  the 
watershed is shown in the Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 Land Use in the Nilüfer Watershed (Bas￿ aran, 2003; Bas￿ aran and Bölen, 2004) 
 
Furthermore,  there  are  many  factories  which  are  separately  located  in  Bursa. 
Approximately 588 plants are established (as of 2000) in Bursa Province, and 58,5 % of 
establishments  –neither  private  sector  nor  public  sector-  do  not  have  a  wastewater 
treatment plant (see below in Table 2). Due to the increasing product costs, existing ones 
are  not  working  effectively.  Hence,  all  industrial  wastewater  is  discharged  without 
treatment  to  surface  water  in  the  watershed  (Bursa  Environmental  Report,  2000;  DSI, 
2000). Therefore, we can declare that authorities who are in charge of inspecting water 
pollution do not fulfill their duties.    9 
Table 2 Wastewater Treatment Plants of Factories in Bursa, 1998 (Bursa Environmental 
Report, p.71, 2000) 
Number of companies   Number of companies which 
have insufficient wastewater 
treatment  
Sectors 
Sum  Public  Private  Sum  Public  Private 
Food  205  8  197  187  8  179 
Textile  128  2  126  59  -  59 
Leather  162  -  162  58  -  58 
Other sectors  93  4  89  40  1  39 
SUM  588  14  574  344  9  335 
 
In addition to industrial development, agricultural products have always been considered 
very important for the economy of Bursa city (SIS, 1982; SIS, 1998). The Watershed has 
fertile agricultural lands, but they are destroyed by unplanned industrial and housing areas 
(Bursa Environmental Report, 2000; Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, 1998). Furthermore, the 
Nilüfer Stream cannot be used for irrigation because of pollution. The pollution of the 
Nilüfer Stream causes an increasing demand on ground water, so a shortage of fresh water 
causes increasing competition among settlement, industry and agriculture. 
The  pollution  of  the  Nilüfer  Stream  has  been  periodically  measured  by  the  General 
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI). As measurements of the DSI, water pollution 
and  fresh  water  consumption  have  increased  because  of  the  industrial  development, 
agriculture and growth of population in the watershed. The results of the water analysis of 
1979-1982 showed that the stream was polluted, and according to the analysis of 2000, 
pollution is still increasing. It is possible to say that the biological balance in the stream is 
completely destroyed (DSI, 1984; DSI, 2000). 
3.2. Decision Makers, their Behaviours and Conflicts 
There  are  31  official  authorities  who  make  decisions  on  the  environmental  issues  and 
planning  in  the  watershed;  6  local  units  (provincial  directorate  of  ministries)  and  the 
Regional Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, the Bursa Provincial Governor, the Bursa 
Special  Provincial  Administration,  the  Bursa  Metropolitan  Municipality,  3  District 
Municipalities within of the Metropolitan Municipality (Nilüfer, Yi￿ ldi￿ ri￿ m, Osmangazi), 7 
District Municipalities (Keles, Gürsu, Mudanya, Karacabey, M.K.Pas￿ a, Orhaneli, Kestel) 
and 11 Sub-District Municipalities (Bas￿ aran, 2003; Bas￿ aran and Bölen, 2004). In addition, 
private enterprises and residents affect the decision making process.    10 
All  decision  makers  (players)  have  their  own  tasks  and  each  one  develop  its  strategy 
according  to  its  own  task.  Some  strategies  conflict  the  other  players’  strategies.  Most 
obvious conflicts are about authority in preparing plans, and they are competing to be the 
approval authority. Municipalities do not want to accord with decisions on industrial land 
use in the upper scale plan (Ünal 2003, Bas￿ aran, 2003; Das￿ öz, 1995). Moreover procedures 
on discharge permissions, emission permit and operation licenses have a complex decision 
making process. It is not clear that institution is granting which permit and who holds the 
authority; these all create chaos (Bas￿ aran and Bölen, 2004). For example, the Ministry of 
Environment  and  Forestry  is  responsible  for  “discharge  license”  outside  the  Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality borders, and the Ministry has higher wastewater standards than 
the standards of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality do (Regulation, 2004; Regulation, 
1998).  However,  the  Ministry  of  Environment  and  Forestry  does  not  have  enough 
personnel  and  sufficient  budget  for  monitoring  and  inspection.  Furthermore,  district 
municipalities are easier on handing out licenses for industrial investments. 
In  recent  years,  unplanned  industrial  areas  are  increasing  around  Bursa.  As  planned 
industrial areas are fully occupied and prices of industrial lands are high, entrepreneurs 
choose settlements where land is cheaper. Industrial companies are willing to be close to 
these settlements, thus they choose to be close to Bursa (Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, 1998). 
Districts  of  the  city  consider  industry  as  a  step  towards  development  and  progress; 
therefore they want industrial terrains in their areas.  
In  conclusion,  we  observe  a  non-cooperative  situation  in  the  watershed,  because  a 
watershed planning and management system does not exist. This situation has threatened 
the sustainability of water as a natural resource. Indeed, the co-organization of the decision 
makers  and  cooperation  among  stakeholders  may  provide  the  sustainability  of  the 
watershed.  
4. Evaluation of the Strategic Decision Process   
The Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan is examined for determination of strategic decisions. The 
Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, which was approved in 1998, is one of the first strategic plan 
experiences in Turkey. The Strategic Plan was prepared together by the Bursa Provincial 
Governor,  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works  and  Settlement,  and  the  Bursa  Metropolitan 
Municipality. Provincial boundaries are accepted as boundaries for the plan (The Bursa   11 
2020  Strategic  Plan,  1998).  However,  a  solid  management  system  is  not  mentioned. 
Therefore, the plan involves many authoritative parties, and this situation cause to increase 
conflict among decision makers (Bademli, 2001).  
Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan (1998) is based on two basic strategies; economic development 
and  environmental  protection,  because  industrial  development  and  environmental 
protection are the major conflict in the watershed at the moment. This conflict can be 
represented by the game of the Battle of the Sexes (Matrix 1). When the environmentalist 
chooses  the  strategy  of  industrial  development,  industrialist  prefers  the  strategy  of 
industrial development. The environmentalist wins “1” unit, because environmental costs 
rise for the environmentalist, and the industrialist wins “2” unit, because the industrialist 
increases  economic  benefit.  On  the  contrary,  when  the  environmentalist  chooses  the 
strategy  of  environmental  protection,  the  industrialist  prefers  the  strategy  of  the 
environmental protection, so the environmentalist wins “2” unit, the industrialist wins “1” 
unit.  






In short, if the strategy of environmental protection is chosen, the industrial development 
should be restricted, or players have to pay environmental costs. However, we realize that 
municipalities, public authorities and industrial investors do not consider environmental 
costs  in  the  watershed.  The  municipalities  have  not  yet  solved  their  environmental 
infrastructure problems, and the most of the factories have no wastewater treatment plant, 
and they have no discharge license, but they work (Bursa Environmental Report, 2000; 
Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, 2004). That is to say, decision makers in the watershed 
prefer the strategy of industrial development. On the other hand, a balance should be found 
between these two strategies for sustainable development.    
 
    Industrialist 
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The  Bursa  2020  Strategic  Plan  (1998)  targets  environmental  protection.  The  Bursa 
Metropolitan  Municipality  has  also  appropriated  same  strategy.  However,  this  strategy 
causes  the  conflict  between  municipalities  and  industrial  enterprises.  The  conflict  is 
illustrated in Matrix 2.  






As  seen  in  Matrix  2,  when  the  municipality  chooses  the  strategy  of  environmental 
protection, if the industrial enterprise prefers the strategy of environmental protection, both 
players win “1” unit. However, if the industrial enterprise prefers the strategy of industrial 
development, the industrial enterprise wins “3” unit whereas the municipality does not gain 
a utility, because environmental costs of the municipality increase. On the other hand, the 
municipality chooses the strategy  of industrial  development, if the industrial enterprise 
prefers the environmental protection, the municipality wins maximum payoff “3”. If the 
industrial enterprise prefers the strategy of industrial development, both player wins “2” 
unit. This situation seems like the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The strategy of industrial 
development is dominant strategy for the municipality and the industrial enterprise, so the 
game has a Nash equilibrium (2, 2).  
The Bursa Strategic Plan (1998) proposes to direct industrial investments to organized 
industrial districts, because it has provision to control industrial pollution. On the other 
hand, no more industrial plants will be allowed in districts of Kestel and Gürsu (upstream 
area) which were once at the outskirts of the city and now they are integrated in the city. 
This way the Bursa plain will be protected and the pollution on the up-stream basin will 
not be carried down-stream. It is a very important problem that pollution is carried by 
water  and  local  authorities  are  not  willing  to  take  responsibility  for  the  cost  of  the 
pollution. The Metropolitan Municipality does not want to be held responsible for water 
pollution  caused  by up-stream industrial plants.  The  same  situation is the  case for the 
down-stream  areas  of  the  watershed.  Pollution  caused  within  the  Metropolitan 
Municipality  creates  negative  effects  for  the  agriculture  in  the  down-stream  of  the 
    Industrial enterprise 
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watershed.  This shows that the basin should be considered and treated as a whole to 
overcome these problems. All agents are linked and the decision of one would influence 
the other and vice versa.  
The  Bursa Strategic Plan (1998) targets  environmental protection and  the reduction of 
industrial water pollution. In addition, the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality appropriates 
the strategies of improvement the quality of life and environment, and the sustainability of 
ecologic  system.  Improving  environmental  infrastructure  and  municipal  wastewater 
treatment is also the main strategy. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Municipality aims to 
develop a sewerage system outside the metropolitan area (Report of Wastewater Master 
Plan, 2002; Bursa 2003).  
In  the  Matrix  3,  the  strategic  decision  process  is  analyzed  between  the  Metropolitan 
Municipality and an industrial enterprise. Each player has two strategies. The first strategy 
of the Metropolitan Municipality is to develop industry and to direct industrial investments 
to organized industrial districts in the downstream area (SA1), and the second strategy is to 
develop environmental infrastructure in the watershed (SA2). The industrial enterprise has 
two location strategies; to locate in the organized industrial districts in the upstream (SB1), 
to locate in the organized industrial districts in downstream (SB2). 
In the watershed, industry trends to develop at up-stream areas, because of proximity to 
Bursa city, transportation and housing facilities. The second biggest organized industrial 
district (Demirtas￿ ) locates in upstream. In addition, Kestel Organized Industrial District 
established in upstream, in 2004. In short, industrial enterprises trend to locate in upstream, 
so the first location strategy of player B has maximum payoff (3). The decision making 
process between the Metropolitan Municipality and an industrial enterprise illustrates in 
Matrix 3.  
Matrix 3 The Decision Making Process of the Metropolitan Municipality and an Industrial 
Enterprise 
 
    Industrial Enterprise 
    SB1  SB2 
SA1  0, 3  3, 2  Metropolitan 
Municipality  SA2  1, 3  0, 2 
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When the Metropolitan Municipality chooses the first strategy (to develop industry and to 
direct industrial investments to organized industrial districts in the downstream area- SA1), 
the industrial enterprise prefers the first strategy (to locate upstream area-SB1). Hence, the 
Metropolitan Municipality wins “0” unit, and the industrial enterprise wins “3” unit. On 
the other hand, if the Metropolitan Municipality chooses the second strategy (to develop 
environmental  infrastructure  in  the  watershed),  industrial  enterprise  prefers  the  first 
strategy (to locate upstream area), again. Thus, the Metropolitan Municipality wins “1” 
unit, industrial enterprise wins “3” unit. The pair of the strategy (SA2, SB1) shows the Nash 
equilibrium, so it is the best response for both players.  
Matrix 3 indicates that the first strategy of the Metropolitan Municipality always fails in 
non-cooperative  situation.  If  the  industrial  enterprise  chose  the  second  strategy,  the 
Metropolitan Municipality would gain “3” unit instead of “1” unit. However, payoff of the 
industrial  enterprise  would  decrease.  In  short,  when  district  municipalities  in  upstream 
have  the  strategy  of  industrial  development,  industrial  enterprises  prefer  to  locate  in 
upstream.  Therefore,  if  the  Metropolitan  Municipality  would  like  to  realize  the  first 
strategy, conflict between her and district municipalities should be solved. The conflict 
matrix is seen in Matrix 4.    











Despite of the Strategic Plan, coordination among actors can not be established. There is 
competition among municipalities in the watershed, so district municipalities plan new 
industrial areas. When player consider the Strategic Plan, the decision making process will 
change (see in Matrix 5).  
    The district municipality in 
upstream  
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Matrix 5 The Decision Making Process of the Metropolitan Municipality and a District 










When players harmonize with the Strategic Plan, payoff of the Metropolitan Municipality 
increases whereas payoff of district municipalities decreases. In other words, if district 
municipalities prefer the strategy of environmental protection, their payoffs will decrease. 
Indeed,  district  municipalities  do  not  want  to  give  up  the  strategy  of  industrial 
development. Therefore, the Metropolitan Municipality should develop new strategy for 
industrial enterprises and the district municipalities. This situation is illustrated in Matrix 6.   
Matrix 6 The Decision Making Process of the Metropolitan Municipality and an Industrial 
Enterprise 
    Industrial Enterprise 
    SB1  SB2 
SA1  0, 2  3, 3  Metropolitan 
Municipality  SA2  1, 2  0, 3 
 
When the industrial enterprise chooses to locate in downstream, the first strategy of the 
Metropolitan  Municipality  (to  develop  industry  and  to  direct  industrial  investments  to 
organized industrial districts in the downstream area-SA1) realizes. However, this situation 
will create new conflicts among district municipalities of downstream. Competition for 
industrial income will rise among district municipalities, so environmental degradation will 
increase in downstream area. Indeed, improvement of the industrial location strategies may 




    A district municipality in 
Upstream  















preventing  the 
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5. Conclusion 
In  this  study,  interactive  decision  making  processes  are  analyzed  according  to  game 
theoretic  approach  in  the  Nilüfer  Watershed.  A  watershed  is  chosen  for  analyzing  of 
behaviours  of  decision  makers  (players),  because  environmental  externalities  could  be 
easily  understood  in  river  systems.  The  Nilüfer  Watershed,  is  a  rich  agricultural  area, 
located in the heavily industrialized and urbanized Bursa metropolitan area. Furthermore, 
according to the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) data, water pollution 
increases  in  the  Nilüfer  Stream.  The  Nilüfer  watershed’s  natural  border  does  not 
correspond with administrative border, and a watershed management does not exist. We 
determined 31 public authorities who decide on the environmental issues and planning in 
the watershed. All of the authorities develop own strategies, and they act independently 
from each other, so we explain this situation as a non-cooperative situation. Moreover, 
players do not consider environmental and planning legislation. However, the cooperation 
among decision makers will provide the sustainability of the watershed.   
In this paper, the strategic decision making process is evaluated with two-person, non-
cooperative games. The Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan involves the development of industry 
and the protection of environment. It also points out that these subjects are themes of the 
major conflicts in the city. This conflict of an environmentalist and industrialist represents 
the Battle of the Sexes game, and the game has no dominant strategy. In addition, the 
conflict  of  a  municipality  and  an  industrial  enterprise  is  modeled  like  the  Prisoner’s 
Dilemma  game.  The  game  demonstrates  that  the  strategy  of  industrial  development  is 
dominant  strategy  for  the  municipalities  and  the  industrial  enterprises.  In  conclusion, 
players  always  choose  the  strategy  of  industrial  development  because  of  economic 
benefits.  
The  various  environmental  protection  strategies  were  developed  in  the  Bursa  Strategic 
Plan. One of the main strategies is to lead industry in organized industrial districts in order 
to control their environmental impacts and to protect agricultural land. Moreover, Bursa is 
growing towards the west (downstream area) and new industrial areas will be organized 
here. Therefore, the strategies of the Metropolitan Municipality and the location strategies 
of the industrial enterprise are evaluated. The decision matrix shows that whatever strategy 
the Metropolitan Municipality chooses, industrial enterprise prefers to locate in upstream 
area. Furthermore, the strategy of to direct industry to downstream causes conflict between   17 
the Metropolitan Municipality and district municipalities of upstream. On the other hand, 
when the industrial investors choose location in downstream area instead of upstream area, 
it creates a new argument. Environmental degradation and industrial pollution can not be 
solved in a long term. This problem shows the importance and necessity of basin scaled 
planning. Water basins are ecological systems and decisions for one spot can affect the 
whole basin.  
We believe that determination of payoffs in planning and environmental decision making 
process is an important problem. Generally, in many of the experiments with matrix games 
the payoffs have tended to be money, but some other measurement units are also used such 
as distance unit, time unit. However, payoffs of strategies cannot determinate in planning 
problems, easily. Therefore, payoffs should be determined by pre-analysis.  
The main outcome of the paper will be to point to new directions in the planning process 
and to open to discussion the use of game theory in planning. Game theoretic approach will 
make it easier for the agents to cooperate if the conflicts in the planned area are clearly 
defined, and game theory provides evaluation strategic decision. It is possible to achieve 
cooperative bargaining solutions where all agents are winners. Actually, this is the target of 
planning because sustainable development of the river basin depends on bargaining where 
all agents are winners.  
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